More on Iraqi deaths

In a previous post, I showed this table, comparing combat death tolls in Iraq for the calendar months of 2004 and 2005 (December 2005 figures estimated based on number of deaths as of midnight between Dec. 15 and Dec. 16), from the highest to lowest combat deaths per month:


2004..2005
131...79
129...75
74....74
65....71
63....69
58....69
58....68
45....48
45....46
39....45
35....42
14....33

The average death toll per month for 2004 was 63 combat deaths per month, and for 2005 was 59.9 combat deaths per month. The standard deviations for 2004 and 2005 were 35.1 and 15.8, respectively. Which gives some quantitation to my claim that the death tolls were more consistent from month-to-month in 2005.

If we control for the two attacks on Fallujah by assuming that the death tolls for April and November of 2004 would be the same as the average of those for the other ten months in 2004, (49.6), then we find the table would change like this:


2004..2005
74....79
65....75
63....74
58....71
58....69
50....69
49....68
45....48
45....46
39....45
35....42
14....33

The average for 2004 would be 49.6 combat deaths per month, with a standard deviation of 17.6 (based on the ten months where we use real rather than interpolated data).

If we were to assume that May's high combat death toll (65) was due to Fallujah, and interpolated the three months' combat death tolls to be the average of the other nine months' (which would come out to 47.9), we would get the following table:


2004..2005
74....79
63....75
58....74
58....71
48....69
48....69
47....68
45....48
45....46
39....45
35....42
14....33

2004 Average: 47.9 deaths per month
St. Dev. (based on 9 months): 17.8

So here are the figures again:


2005 : 59.9 ± 15.8
2004 : 63.0 ± 35.1
2004*: 49.6 ± 17.6
2004†: 47.9 ± 17.8


*Adjusting April 2004 and November 2004
†Adjusting April, November, and May 2004

So overall, other than the attacks on Fallujah 2005 would have likely been a deadlier year than 2004, and 2005 showed a more consistent combat death toll, largely due to the Fallujah assaults, although it would have been slightly more consistent even without them.

I suppose one could argue that the fact that we did not need to do another Fallujah-style assault is a sign of victory; on the other hand, this would indicate that the insurgents are getting more successful in their attacks, in that they are causing about as many deaths without massive urban combat as they did last year, which included massive urban combat.

That is all.