Thoughts on Iraq

A friend recently opined to me that part of the reason why things are not going so well in Iraq may be because the Iraqis are uncertain as to whether we will stay and "get the job done," and may be afraid that Saddam (or other Ba'athists) will come back to power as soon as we leave.

While this theory can be very comforting to pro-warriors, who can see this as a reason to stay in Iraq and as confirmation that the Iraqis love us dearly, I don't see it as accurate.

There are two reasons:

First, the Ba'ath Party has been smashed. We've captured almost the entire "deck of cards." Saddam is our prisoner. The Shiite Arabs outnumber the Sunni Arabs by around three-to-one (four-to-one if the Kurds and Shi'a align against the Sunni Arabs). There is little that could be done now to bring the Ba'ath Party back against the Shiite majority, unless the U.S. actively put them back in power.

Granted, we have promised to help the Iraqi overthrow Saddam before and then backed out, but this is he first time that we have actually overthrown and him and then captured him. I don't think that many Iraqis seriously think that in our absence, Saddam will be released and then gain power again.

Not that people may not be afraid of who will take over if we leave; but they would more likely be afraid of Iran or of Moqtada al-Sadr than of Saddam.

Second, even if much of the populace is afraid of Saddam coming back, it is not entirely clear to me how they would behave in a way more amenable to the U.S. if they were convinced that we would not let him come back. Most of the current problems in Iraq that are threatening to cause chaos are the result of individuals, tribes, and ethnic groups jockeying for position in the new Iraq, none of which is based on the assumption that Saddam could come back.

Put another way, the idea that "fear of American withrawal" is a major obstacle to our goals in Iraq presumes that most Iraqis love us and share our goals for Iraq, but are afraid to say so because they don't want to be on the wrong side if we bug out. If they could jsut be conviunced we would stay, then Iraqis will show themselves for the nice little democracy-lovers that they are.

But I see little evidence that most Iraqis are particularly enamored of us, or that their and our goals for Iraq coincide beyond the short-term. So if we could convince Iraqis that we would stay in large, "whatever-it-takes" numbers for the next five years, and beyond if necessary, I don't think it would dampen the insurgency severely, or cause a sudden outpour of pro-US sentiment.

In fact, increasing conviction that the Ba'athists would not return (and that U.S. troops need no longer defend the Shi'a from such a possibility) may have been a factor in the rise of Moqtada al-Sadr. It may yet cause additional problems for us in the Shiite areas, as the Shi'a become convinced that they no longer need us as a bulwark against the Sunni Arabs, and therefore, can risk offending us.

I think that the flaw in this sort of theorizing lies in trying to look at the Iraq War as having two sides: pro- and anti-Saddam. In reality, there are several sides, each working for their own goals, each motivated by their own drives, and with each responding in their own way to different incentives. There is no single force causing the problems in Iraq; no one side that we can go after, eliminate, and then everything is okay. There is no one explanation for our problems in Iraq that we can use as a clue as to how to improve the situation.

And so we plow on, trying to quench the fires one at a time.

That is all.