Insuring High Turnout

Justin Raimondo has an interesting theory about how we'll insure high voting turnout in the Iraqi elections:
Namely, he thinks that we, or Iraiqs who believe that they will benefit from the elections, will coerce people to vote in order to insure high turnout.
So for those who are afraid to vote, there will now be a "damned if you do, damned if you don't factor" so the threats that might keep them home will be counterbalanced by threats if they stay home.
In all due fairness, I don't see that in the article that Justin references, and the statement by Falah Hassan al-Naqib seems more hyperbolic to me than an actual legal charge against non-voters.
On the other hand, intimidation of non-voters to balance out intimidation of voters would be ocnsistent with Justin's theory about Abu Ghraib:
Essnetially, the insurgency can only work if a lrage potion of the opulation acquiesces, either out of fear or out of sympathy for the insurgents.
Terrorizing Iraqis for non-compliance with even small rules (e.g. breaking curfew) might make them more scared of us than of the insurgents, and might also overcome any sympathy toward insurgents that some Iraqis may feel.

It's an interesting theory, and bears consideration. However, I'll wait for more data before I commit to an explanation.

That is all for now.