One problem with the war in Iraq is that because the pro-war side consists of so many disparate camps that sometimes one will make an excellent criticism of one of the others, but on another aspect of the larger "war on terror" their ideas are even more extreme and unrealistic.
For example, Look at this piece by Andrew MCarthy. He is very correct that most of the people in the US are more concerned with Iraq not being a threat than they are with it being democratic.
However, he seems to be conflating the concept that we should not make democratization priority number one with the idea that we need to expand the war:
"To the extent there is public uneasiness, it is not over the fact of that war but rather the manner in which it is being prosecuted, with terrorists continuing to score successes and their facilitators in Iran and Syria making war on American forces with impunity."
Well, yes, public uneasiness with the war on terror is not with the war itself but with how we are prosecuting it. However, I doubt that much public uneasiness is with the fact that we haven't taken action against Syria and Iran. I doubt very many people want an expansion of the war (and if you doubt that military action is what he is suggesting, read this: "I might have considered doing that BEFORE Iraq since we knew that Iran was harboring al Qaeda leadership before the Iraq operation started – in addition to Iran’s rich record of anti-American terrorism." He's not talking about harsh words or sanctions here. I suppose one could argue that he is not suggesting military action but a covert operation to overthrow the mullahs using internal dissidents, but let's be honest, that will fail wihtout American military support, Michael Ledeen's insanity notwithstanding).
I also think that he exaggerrates the extent of Saddam's ties to terrorists that threaten us, and also makes the unwarranted assumption that the best way to solve the ties that were there was to topple his regime. It seems to me that with a few minor incentives we could have gotten Saddam to stop giving money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, to have handed over whatever terrorists were hiding out in Iraq, and to offer his help in apprehending more.
Also, let's remember that Mr. McCarthy is one of the Chalabists:
"It would be very convenient for me to second-guess what I would have done differently at this point. I hope I would have handled Iraq as the Pentagon hoped to handle Iraq, because I think that was a good plan (i.e., installing an Iraqi government in waiting at an early stage)."
Now, of course installing a government in waiting doesn't necessarily mean Chalabi, but Chalabi was the one that the Defense Department had hoped to install at the time, and I'm not certain who else would have been available. Also, as he hopes he "would have handled Iraq as the Pentagon hoped to handle Iraq," and the Pentagon hoped to install Chalabi, this means that he wanted to put Chalabi in there.
While I agree that democratization was too lofty a goal, I don't think that installing an exile with little or no support among Iraqis, who has a reputation of dishonesty and embezzlement, and who now is suspected of being an Iranian agent, was a much better solution.
Moreover, he gives the impression that democratization was always seen as a secondary objective, with eliminating terrorism being the primary. This is either dishonest or else (much more likely) he is remembering only thsoe arguments for the war that reflected his own concerns. That we were trying to democratize the Middle East and that this was an essential, non-negotiable objective of the war was drummed into our heads from the start. In fact, there were many who argued for conquering (sorry, "liberating") Iraq regardless of any terrorist connections, simply because making Iraq a democracy would spread freedom throughout the Middle East and thus "drain the swamp" of terrorism.
In all due fairness, a lot of people I have talked to during the invasion denied that there was any such agenda or that the administration had made that a major objective (oh, no, he isn't planning a democracy. He just wants to defend us against Saddam. This is about terrorism, not nation-building). Considering how much I'd heard the discussion about how we had to democratize Iraq, this floored me. I can only assume that these people were selectively listening to what we were being told, and that they just assumed that Bush's goals as to the war were the same as their own.
Or, perhaps, the problem is that I was listening to the neoconservative ideologues like Norman Podhoretz and Michael Ledeen while everyone else was listening to Bush, and perhaps Bush demured on the democracy issue while the ideologues pushing the war from behind-the-scenes were much more open about the real goals. If that is the case, then the problem is that the majority of the country made the mistake of listening to the administration's proclamations without paying attention to what the people behind the policy were pushing.
All I know is that I recognized the messianic democratism in this Middle East project way back in 2001 or 2002, long before the invasion of Iraq. Lots of other people don't remember it being a part of the justifications for, or objectives of, the war, but I had it pegged from the get-go. And now look who are the ones who are surprised.
That is all. For now.
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